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We investigate the connection between the two major mathematical frameworks for modeling inter-
active beliefs: Harsanyi type spaces and possible-worlds–style probability frames. While translating
the former into the latter is straightforward, we demonstrate that the reverse translation relies implic-
itly on a background logical language. Once this “language parameter” is made explicit, it reveals
a close relationship between universal type spaces and canonical models: namely, that they are es-
sentially the same construct. As the nature of a canonical model depends heavily on the background
logic used to generate it, this work suggests a new view into a corresponding landscape of universal
type spaces.
1 Introduction
There are two mathematical frameworks in widespread use for modeling beliefs in multi-agent systems.
One approach, popular among computer scientists and logicians, utilizes the possible worlds paradigm
(see, e.g., [9]). Roughly speaking, a probability frame consists of a set of worlds, each of which is
associated with a set of probability measures (one for each agent), defined on the set of worlds. These
probability measures are interpreted as encoding beliefs. Hierarchical beliefs—for example, beliefs about
what another agent believes—are naturally captured by the recursive structure of this framework, namely
the fact that worlds encode beliefs about worlds. The second approach, more standard in game theory,
uses type spaces, introduced by Harsanyi [11]. Roughly speaking, types spaces are composed of states,
encoding “basic” facts about the world (typically including which strategies the players are using), to-
gether with types, encoding the beliefs of each player in the form of a probability measure defined over
the states and the types of her opponents.
What is the relationship between probability frames and type spaces? Aside from a few measure-
theoretic technicalities, it is relatively straightforward to transform a type space into a probability frame:
essentially, the worlds are state-type pairs. Reversing this transformation is not so straightforward. Given
a probability frame, the key question is how to “factor” worlds into states and types. Probability frames
encode beliefs about worlds, beliefs about beliefs about worlds, and so on, but this never “bottoms out”
in anything like the states in a type space. That is, there is no obvious component of a world that encodes
facts such as what strategies the agents are using or the value participants in an auction might assign to
an item up for bid. Thus, there seems to be a mismatch between the two approaches.
In this paper, we resolve this mismatch by adding a language—a set of basic facts (such as what
strategy is used by each agent), represented by primitive propositions—to the picture. In the terminology
of modal logic, we pass from frames to models. Given a language, a model is simply a frame together
with an interpretation that determines for each world w and primitive proposition p in the language
whether p is true in world w. But then we must decide which language to use. We show that the right
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choice of language can provide exactly the additional structure needed to “cleanly” factor worlds into
states and types. Specifically, we define a transformation on probability models that takes language
as a parameter, and show that it produces the familiar type space construction when the language is
appropriately expressive.
The value of forging such a connection between the two major mathematical frameworks for mod-
eling belief is obvious: improved communication between researchers working in these respective tra-
ditions, and the prospect of importing insights and results from one paradigm to another. And indeed,
one immediate application of our language-sensitive translation is a link between two fundamental no-
tions: that of a canonical model from the world of modal logic (see, e.g., [2]) and that of a universal
type space from the theoretical economics literature [17]. Each of these constructions plays a central
role in the subfield to which it belongs, and these roles are very similar: each is, in a precise sense, the
“largest” structure of its kind—a structure that essentially contains all other such structures. It is per-
haps not surprising that they are effectively the same structure: roughly speaking, we show in Section
4.3 that canonical models are transformed into universal type spaces.1 Moreover, since canonical model
constructions are highly sensitive to the underlying logical language, this result suggests a new view into
a landscape of universal type spaces parametrized by language.
Much of this work was inspired by a beautiful paper of Heifetz and Samet [14]. In it, they construct
a measure-theoretic universal type space by a process that closely mimics a standard canonical-model
construction (though they do not describe it that way). Our work can be viewed as generalizing their
construction to produce a translation from arbitrary probability frames to type spaces; our Theorem
9 is then the special case of applying this translation to the canonical model associated with a certain
specific logic. In order to emphasize this connection, much of the notation and terminology of this paper
duplicates or parallels that used by Heifetz and Samet.
In fact, our “canonical model” construction differs in small but significant ways from the standard
construction in modal logic. Typically, worlds in the canonical model are realized as maximal consistent
sets of formulas from the language, where consistency is, of course, defined relative to some background
axiom system. However, the standard finitary axiom system used to reason about probability frames has
a problem, namely, it is not compact: there exists an infinite set F of formulas that is not satisfiable such
that every finite subset of F is satisfiable (which means that F is consistent with the axioms). This renders
the corresponding canonical model not a model at all. To avoid this issue, we replace “consistency”
with “satisfiability” in our canonical model construction. (Aumann [1] uses an analogous construction.)
Meier [16] considers an alternative approach: changing the axiom system. Specifically, he considers
an infinitary axiom system (with infinitary rules of inference) with respect to which consistency and
satisfiability coincide, and constructs a universal type space using a canonical model style construction
over this infinitary logic. Although Meier’s logic is infinitary (he allows uncountable conjunctions and
disjunctions) and our language is finitary, his canonical model is essentially isomorphic to ours (see
Section 4 for further discussion).2 Conceptually, however, our goals are somewhat different from those
of Aumann and Meier. Aumann and Meier focus on the construction of the canonical model. By way
of contrast, we approach the issue as a problem first of how to transform an arbitrary probability frame
into a type space, and observe afterwards that this translation connects a (suitably defined) notion of
canonical model to that of a universal type space.
We are not the first to study the general relationship between type spaces and possible-worlds–style
structures. One connection via logic is well known. Sound and complete axiomatizations have been
1We remark that Meier [16] already observed this connection in the case of an infinitary language.
2We thank Martin Meier for pointing this important connection between our work, his work, and that of Aumann.
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provided for various logics of probability: Heifetz and Mongin [12] considered a finitary logic where
the basic statements have the form Bθi ϕ (agent i believes that the probability of ϕ is at least θ )—this is
the same logic that we consider—and provided a sound and complete axiomatization in their logic for
type systems; Meier [16] did the same for an infinitary logic. Since the axioms are easily seen to be
sound in probability frames, and every type structure can be viewed as a probability frame, soundness
and completeness of these axiomatizations for probability frames follows. Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo
[5, 4] provided a sound and complete axiomatization of a logic that allowed reasoning about linear
combinations of probabilities (i.e., statements such as 2ℓi(ϕ)+3ℓi(ψ)≥ 1.5, which can be read as “twice
agent i’s probability of ϕ plus three times agent i’s probability of ψ is at least 1.5”) in probability frames.
Since their axioms are easily seen to be sound in type spaces and statements about linear combinations
can be expresssed in Meier’s infinitary logic, it follows that this axiomatization is also complete for type
spaces.
The work on axiomatizations does not produce an explicit translation between type spaces and
possible-worlds structures. In more recent work, Galeazzi and Lorini [8] develop a translation between
the two and prove a semantic equivalence result. They, too, work at the level of models rather than
frames (though they do not explicitly discuss this choice); however, their translations are defined model-
theoretically with respect to a single fixed language, rather than taking language as a parameter, making
the approach we develop more flexible and more broadly applicable. While the translation they propose
from (what we call) probability models into type spaces is not a special case of ours, it is similar in spirit.
However, there is one significant difference: in passing through language, our approach effectively iden-
tifies worlds that satisfy all the same formulas, while theirs does not (in particular, “duplicate” worlds
produce duplicate types under their translation, but not under ours). Semantically speaking, provided we
fix an appropriately expressive language, the type spaces we produce are equivalent, once we identify
types that satisfy the same formulas. By varying the language, however, our translations take on different
characters—they preserve more or less of the type space structure in accordance with what is expressible
in the language. Moreover, Galeazzi and Lorini restrict their attention to countable structures, which
effectively precludes consideration of structures like universal type spaces or canonical models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic mathematical frameworks
within which we work. Section 3 motivates and defines the translations from type spaces to probability
frames and vice-versa. Section 4 presents the connection between universal type spaces and canonical
models discussed above. Section 5 concludes. Some proofs have been omitted or abridged due to length
requirements.
2 Preliminaries
The definition of a type space typically includes various topological assumptions that make it easier to
prove certain results of interest within that framework [3]. Since our goal is to understand the connection
between type spaces and probability frames, we opt instead to work in as minimal a setting as possible, so
as not to obscure the translations between the two with additional topological bookkeeping. In particular,
following Heifetz and Samet [14], we work with a purely measure-theoretic definition of types spaces.
A measurable space is a set X together with a σ -algebra ΣX over X ; elements of ΣX are called
measurable sets or events. We often drop explicit mention of ΣX and refer simply to “the measurable
space X”. We denote by ∆(X) the measurable space of all probability measures on X equipped with the
σ -algebra generated by all sets of the form
B
θ (E) := {µ ∈ ∆(X) : µ(E)≥ θ},
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where θ ∈ [0,1] and E ∈ ΣX is an event. Given measurable spaces X1, . . . ,Xk, the measurable space
X1×·· ·×Xk is just the usual product space equipped with the σ -algebra generated by all sets of the form
E1×·· ·×Ek, where each Ei ∈ ΣXi .
Given a probability measure µ on X , the associated outer measure, denoted µ∗, is defined on arbi-
trary subsets of X as follows:
µ∗(A) := inf{µ(E) : E ∈ ΣX and E ⊇ A}.
Obviously, if A ∈ ΣX , then µ
∗(A) = µ(A). Otherwise, if A is not a measurable set, the outer measure of
A can be thought of as a kind of approximation of the measure of A from above: every event containing
A has probability at least µ∗(A), and for all ε > 0, there is an event E ⊇ A with µ(E)−µ∗(A)< ε .
Fix a finite set I = {1, . . . ,n} of agents. We adopt the usual notational game-theoretic conventions
for tuples over I: Given (Xi)i∈I , we write
X := ∏
i∈I
Xi and X−i := ∏
j 6=i
X j.
We also write X ′i ×X−i for
X1×·· ·×Xi−1×X
′
i ×Xi+1×·· ·×Xn
and similarly (x′i,x−i) for
(x1, . . . ,xi−1,x
′
i,xi+1, . . . ,xn).
A type space (over I) is a tuple T = (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I) where
• X is a measurable space of states;
• Ti is a measurable space of i-types;
• βi : Ti → ∆(X ×T ) is a measurable function such that the marginal of βi(ti) on Ti is δti , the point-
mass measure concentrated on ti.
Intuitively, X captures the basic facts about which the agents may be uncertain, while i-types represent
the beliefs of agent i via the function βi. These beliefs are not just about the states, but also about the
types (and therefore the beliefs) of the agents. In this context, the requirement that βi be measurable can
be thought of as a closure condition on events: for all events E ⊆ X ×T , the set of points where agent i
assigns E probability at least θ , namely
X×β−1i (B
θ(E))×T−i,
is itself an event. The extra condition on βi is meant to ensure that agent i is introspective: that is, sure
of her own beliefs. The point-mass measure δti is defined on the measurable subsets of Ti by
δti(E) =
{
1 if ti ∈ E
0 if ti /∈ E .
Thus, δti assigns probability 1 to all and only the events containing ti. Note that in general we cannot
simply say that {ti} has probability 1 according to agent i, since {ti} may not be measurable; instead, we
can say that every event incompatible with ti has probability 0 according to agent i.
3 Equivalently, δti is
the unique probability measure on Ti that assigns {ti} outer measure 1. A probability frame (over I) is
a tuple F = (Ω,(Pri)i∈I) where
3This subtlety does not typically arise in the richer topological setting: provided Ti is a T1-space (see, e.g., [18]; there is an
unfortunate clash of notation here), {ti} is closed and therefore part of the Borel σ -algebra associated with Ti.
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• Ω is a measurable space of worlds;
• Pri : Ω→ ∆(Ω) is a measurable function such that, for each ω ∈Ω, Pri(ω)
∗(Pr−1i (Pri(ω))) = 1.
Here, all information is encoded in Ω, basic facts and beliefs alike. As with type spaces, the measurability
of Pri yields a closure condition on events: for all events E ⊆Ω, the set of points where agent i assigns E
probability at least θ is given by Pr−1i (B
θ(E)) and is therefore measurable. And as above, the additional
condition on Pri amounts to the stipulation that agent i is sure of her own beliefs in the sense that at each
world ω , Pri(ω) assigns outer measure 1 to the set
Pr−1i (Pri(ω)) = {ω
′ : Pri(ω
′) = Pri(ω)},
namely, the set of worlds where her beliefs are given by the measure Pri(ω). If this set is measurable,
of course, then it is itself assigned probability 1. In much of the literature the measurability of this set
is simply assumed. We adopt the slightly more cumbersome definition given above using outer measure
because it is more general and because it parallels the introspection condition assumed in type spaces in
a way that helps to streamline the translation between the two.
3 Translations
Informally, a type space looks like a probability frame where the set of worlds Ω has been “factored”
into a component representing basic facts—the states—and components representing the beliefs of the
agents—the types. As discussed in the introduction, given a probability frame, it is not clear how to
perform such a factorization; most of this section is concerned with developing a solution to this problem.
The reverse construction, on the other hand, is straightforward, so we begin with it.
Proposition 1. Let T = (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I) be a type space, and define Ω :=X×T and Pri(x, t) := βi(ti).
Then FT := (Ω,(Pri)i∈I) is a probability frame.
Proof. This is the obvious construction; all that needs to be checked is that Pri satisfies the appropri-
ate conditions. Measurability of this function is an easy consequence of the measurability of βi, since
Pr−1i (E ) = X×β
−1
i (E )×T−i. For introspection, observe that
Pri(x, t)
∗(Pr−1i (Pri(x, t))) = βi(ti)
∗({(x′, t ′) : βi(t
′
i) = βi(ti)}) = 1,
since every measurable set containing {(x′, t ′) : βi(t
′
i) = βi(ti)} is of the form X×U×T−i, whereU ⊆ Ti
is measurable and contains ti.
In what sense is FT the “right” translation of T ? Intuitively, we want to say that the relevant
properties of agents and their beliefs that are captured by T are also captured by FT , and in some sense
preserved by this translation. To make this precise, we formalize the notion of “relevant properties” by
identifying them with formulas in a suitably expressive logical language; we then show that the map
T 7→ FT is truth-preserving with respect to this language (Proposition 2). In addition to providing a
formal standard by which to evaluate purported translations between models, making the background
language explicit lays the groundwork for the reverse translation, which makes essential use of this
structure.
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3.1 Language
Fix a set Φ of primitive propositions and a set Θ ⊆ [0,1] of thresholds; let L ΘB (Φ, I) be the language
recursively generated by the grammar
ϕ ::= p |¬ϕ |ϕ ∧ψ |Bθi ϕ ,
where p ∈ Φ, i ∈ I, and θ ∈ Θ. The parameters Φ and I are omitted when they are clear from context.
The other Boolean connectives can be defined in the standard way. We read Bθi ϕ as “agent i believes
that the probability of ϕ is at least θ”. Intuitively, Θ collects the set of thresholds that the language can
express beliefs up to.
There is a standard way of interpreting formulas of L ΘB (Φ, I) in probability frames. A probability
model (over (Φ, I)) is a tuple M = (F ,pi) where F is a probability frame (over I) and pi : Φ → ΣΩ
is an interpretation. Recall that ΣΩ denotes the σ -algebra associated with the measurable space Ω; the
event pi(p) ⊆Ω is conceptualized as the set of worlds where the primitive proposition p is true. We can
extend this notion of truth to all formulas by defining [[·]]M : L
Θ
B → ΣΩ recursively as follows:
[[p]]M = pi(p)
[[¬ϕ ]]M = Ω [[ϕ ]]M
[[ϕ ∧ψ ]]M = [[ϕ ]]M ∩ [[ψ ]]M
[[Bθi ϕ ]]M = {ω ∈Ω : Pri(ω)([[ϕ ]]M )≥ θ}.
Of course, the final clause of this definition only makes sense if [[ϕ ]]M is measurable, which follows
from an easy induction on formulas using the fact that
[[Bθi ϕ ]]M = Pr
−1
i (B
θ ([[ϕ ]]M )).
We say that a formula ϕ is true at ω (in M ) if ω ∈ [[ϕ ]]M , and that a set F of formulas is true at ω
if each ϕ ∈ F is true at ω . A formula or set of formulas is valid in M if it is satisfied at all worlds in M ,
and satisfiable in M if it is true at some world in M ; it is valid if it is valid in all probability models,
and satisfiable if it is satisfiable in some probability model.
It is worth noting that the introspection condition on frames, which says that every event containing
Pr−1i (Pri(ω)) has probability 1 according to Pri(ω), allows us to deduce the following for all probability
models M (assuming 1 ∈ Θ):
ω ∈ [[Bθi ϕ ]]M ⇒ Pr
−1
i (Pri(ω))⊆ [[B
θ
i ϕ ]]M
⇒ Pri(ω)([[B
θ
i ϕ ]]M ) = 1
⇒ ω ∈ [[B1i B
θ
i ϕ ]]M .
This implies that the formula Bθi ϕ → B
1
i B
θ
i ϕ is valid: whenever agent i believes the probability of ϕ is
at least θ , she is sure that she has this belief. A similar argument shows that ¬Bθi ϕ → B
1
i ¬B
θ
i ϕ is valid.
Of course, this also follows from the stronger assumption that Pr−1i (Pri(ω)) is itself measurable and has
probability 1, but relative to this logical language, such an assumption is overkill.
We can also interpret L ΘB (Φ, I) in type spaces. Although this is not typically done in the literature
(though Galeazzi and Lorini [8] do), it allows us to state formally the connection between T and FT as
defined in Proposition 1, and it highlights the analogies between type spaces and probability frames that
we exploit below.
A. Bjorndahl & J. Y. Halpern 81
An interpreted type space (over (Φ, I)) is a pair I = (T ,ν) where T is a type space and ν :
Φ → ΣX is an interpretation; intuitively, ν(p) specifies the states of nature where p is true. As above, ν
induces a function [[·]]I : L
Θ
B → ΣX×T as follows:
[[p]]I = ν(p)×T
[[¬ϕ ]]I = (X ×T ) [[ϕ ]]I
[[ϕ ∧ψ ]]I = [[ϕ ]]I ∩ [[ψ ]]I
[[Bθi ϕ ]]I = {(x, t) ∈ X ×T : βi(ti)([[ϕ ]]I )≥ θ}.
Now we can formalize the sense in which the map T 7→FT is truth-preserving.
Proposition 2. Let I = (T ,ν) be an interpreted type space, and let FT be the probability frame
corresponding to T as defined in Proposition 1. Define pi(p) := ν(p)×T . Then MI := (FT ,pi) is a
probability model, and for all ϕ ∈L ΘB , we have [[ϕ ]]MI = [[ϕ ]]I .
Proof. Proposition 1 tells us that FT is a probability frame, and since ν(p) ∈ ΣX , it is clear that pi(p) ∈
ΣX×T ; it follows that MI is a probability model.
The equality [[ϕ ]]MI = [[ϕ ]]I is proved by an easy structural induction on ϕ . The base cases where
ϕ ∈Φ follows from the definition of pi , and the induction steps are all trivial.
Proposition 2 is parametrized by the choice of primitive propositions Φ and the interpretation ν :
it says that for any such choice, the correspondence T 7→ FT can be extended to a correspondence
I 7→ MI that is truth preserving with respect to the language L
Θ
B (Φ). It is worth emphasizing a
special case of this result. Given a type space T = (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I), recall that the set X of states is
often conceptualized as representing the “basic facts” about the game; for example, the strategy profiles
that may be played. As such, when X is finite (or even just when ΣX contains all singletons), it is natural
to take Φ = X and define ν(x) = {x}; in this case, intuitively, the primitive propositions simply say what
the true state is.
3.2 Factoring worlds
We turn now to the reverse translation: the construction of a suitable type space from a given probability
frame. As we have observed, the difficulty lies in “factoring” worlds into states and types. Given a prob-
ability frame F = (Ω,(Pri)i∈I), we might hope to identify types for player i with probability measures
of the form Pri(ω) for ω ∈Ω, but what are the states? This is the crux of the problem: there is nothing
in the definition of F that allows us to distinguish the “part” of a world ω that represents basic facts;
indeed, there is no notion of a “basic fact” at all in a probability frame.
A sufficiently rich logical language, however, such as L ΘB , does distinguish “basic” facts from facts
about beliefs. For this reason, the construction of a type space naturally operates at the level of probability
models (which can interpret languages) rather than frames, and depends crucially on the background
language.
An L ΘB -description is a set D ⊆ L
Θ
B of formulas that is satisfiable and also maximal in the sense
that, for each ϕ ∈ L ΘB , either ϕ ∈ D or ¬ϕ ∈ D. Given a probability model M and a world ω in M ,
define the L ΘB -description of ω in M to be
D(ω) := {ϕ ∈L ΘB : ω ∈ [[ϕ ]]M }.
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We omit mention of the language and the model when it is safe to do so. It is easy to see that D(ω) is
an L ΘB -description; we call D the description map for M . Intuitively, D(ω) records all the information
about the world ω expressible in the language L ΘB . Let d0(ω) denote the subset of D(ω) consisting
of the purely propositional formulas: that is, Boolean combinations of the primitive propositions. Let
di(ω) consist of the formulas in D(ω) that are Boolean combinations of formulas of the form B
θ
i ϕ . Call
these the 0-description and the i-description of ω , respectively. We think of the former as recording the
basic facts about ω (expressible in L ΘB ), and the latter as recording the beliefs of agent i in ω (again,
expressible in L ΘB ).
Fix a probability model M = ((Ω,(Pri)i∈I),pi). We construct a type space out of M by identifying
states with 0-descriptions and i-types with i-descriptions. Formally, set
X := {d0(ω) : ω ∈Ω} and Ti := {di(ω) : ω ∈Ω}.
Intuitively, each state and each type is constituted by a fragment of information about some world ω in
M . We also use this information to define the measure structure: for each ϕ ∈L ΘB , set
E0(ϕ) := {x ∈ X : ϕ ∈ x} and Ei(ϕ) := {ti ∈ Ti : ϕ ∈ ti};
we consider X and Ti as measurable spaces equipped with the σ -algebras generated by the collections
{E0(ϕ) : ϕ ∈L
Θ
B } and {Ei(ϕ) : ϕ ∈L
Θ
B }, respectively.
The reason we use formulas to pick out events is because, ultimately, we will define each probability
measure βi(ti) on X × T using the information encoded in ti about the likelihoods of formulas. For
example, if Bθi ϕ ∈ ti, this tells us that βi(ti) must assign probability at least θ to the subset of X × T
where ϕ holds. Of course, in order to make sense of this, we must first define the event in X × T that
corresponds to ϕ .
As a first step toward this, we show that given a state-type tuple (x, t) ∈ X × T , the collection of
formulas obtained by taking the union of all these partial descriptions, namely x∪
⋃
i ti, is satisfiable.
It is obvious that every 0-description x ∈ X and i-description ti ∈ Ti is individually satisfiable since, by
definition, each is satisfied at some world in M . On the other hand, there is no guarantee that they are
all satisfied at the same world in M (and in general they may not be), so their joint satisfiability is not so
obvious.
Lemma 3. For all (x, t) ∈ X ×T, the collection x∪
⋃
i ti is satisfiable.
Proof. As observed, there are worlds ω0, . . . ,ωn in M such that ω0 satisfies x and ωi satisfies ti for
i = 1, . . . ,n. We now construct a model M ∗ and world ω∗ in M ∗ such that M ∗ consists of n disjoint
copies of M together with the world ω∗; formally, M ∗ = ((Ω∗,(Pr∗i )i∈I),pi
∗), where
• Ω∗ = {(ω , i) : ω ∈Ω, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}}∪{ω∗};
• pi∗(p) =
{
∪ni=1(pi(p)×{i}) if ω0 /∈ pi(p)
∪ni=1(pi(p)×{i})∪{ω
∗} if ω0 ∈ pi(p)
• Pr∗i (ω , i)(U ×{i}) = Pri(ω)(U) for ω ∈ Ω, and Pri(ω
∗)(U ×{i}) = Pri(ωi)(U) (so the support
of Pr∗i (ω , i) and of Pri(ω∗) is contained Ω×{i}).
It is easy to check that ω∗ agrees with ω0 on propositional formulas and with ωi on i-descriptions. Thus,
the desired result holds.
In fact, not only is x∪
⋃
i ti satisfiable, but it determines a unique L
Θ
B -description.
Lemma 4. There is a unique L ΘB -description D such that D⊇ x∪
⋃
i ti.
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Proof. By Lemma 3, such a D exists (take D = D(ω) for some ω that satisfies x∪
⋃
i ti). Uniqueness
follows from the following observation, easily proved by structural induction on ϕ : for all ϕ ∈ L ΘB ,
either x∪
⋃
i ti entails ϕ or x∪
⋃
i ti entails ¬ϕ .
Let D(x, t) denote the unique description determined by x∪
⋃
i ti as in Lemma 4. It is easy to see that
D(d0(ω),d(ω)) = D(ω). On the other hand, as mentioned above, the collection of descriptions of the
form D(x, t) may be strictly larger than those of the form D(ω), since some tuples (x, t) may combine
partial descriptions that are not simultaneously satisfied at any world in M .
The description D(x, t) provides a natural way to associate formulas with events in X ×T . For each
ϕ ∈L ΘB , define
[ϕ ] := {(x, t) ∈ X ×T : ϕ ∈ D(x, t)}.
Lemma 5. ΣX×T is generated by the collection {[ϕ ] : ϕ ∈L
Θ
B }.
Proof. It is easy to see that every ϕ ∈ L ΘB is a Boolean combination of primitive propositions and
formulas of the form Bθi ψ ; it follows that {[ϕ ] : ϕ ∈L
Θ
B } is the algebra generated by all sets of the form
[p] and [Bθi ψ ]. Now observe that (x, t) ∈ [p] iff p ∈ x, so [p] = E0(p)×T , and similarly, (x, t) ∈ [B
θ
i ψ ]
iff Bθi ψ ∈ ti, so [B
θ
i ψ ] = X ×Ei(B
θ
i ψ)×T−i. Thus, {[ϕ ] : ϕ ∈L
Θ
B } ⊆ ΣX×T .
To see that ΣX×T is in fact generated by this collection, it suffices to observe that if each of E0(ϕ0),
E1(ϕ1), . . . , En(ϕn) is nonempty, then
E0(ϕ0)×E1(ϕ1)×·· ·×En(ϕn) = [ϕ0∧ϕ1∧ ·· ·∧ϕn].
We turn now to defining the probability measures βi(ti). Each ti ∈ Ti is a collection of formulas in
L ΘB that bear on agent i’s beliefs. We can use these formulas to constrain the space of possible outputs
of βi(ti). Moreover, provided L
Θ
B is rich enough, these contraints yield a unique probability measure.
Let Pti denote the set of all probability measures µ on X × T such that, for each ϕ ∈ L
Θ
B and all
θ ∈ Θ,
µ([ϕ ])≥ θ ⇔ Bθi ϕ ∈ ti. (1)
Lemma 6. Pti 6= /0. Moreover, if Θ is dense in [0,1], then |Pti |= 1.
Proof. First we show that Pti is nonempty. Let ω be a world in M such that di(ω) = ti. For each
ϕ ∈L ΘB , define
µi,ω ([ϕ ]) = Pri(ω)([[ϕ ]]M ).
One can check that µi,ω is a pre-measure on the algebra {[ϕ ] : ϕ ∈L
Θ
B } and satisfies (1). By Carathe´odory’s
extension theorem [7, Theorem 1.14], there is a unique extension µ˜i,ω of µi,ω to the σ -algebra generated
by {[ϕ ] : ϕ ∈L ΘB }, which by Lemma 5 is just ΣX×T . Therefore, by construction, µ˜i,ω ∈Pti .
If Θ is dense in [0,1], then it is easy to see that for all ϕ ∈L ΘB , if µ ∈Pti then
µ([ϕ ]) = sup{θ ∈ Θ : Bθi ϕ ∈ ti}.
It follows that Pti = {µ˜i,ω}.
Let us restrict our attention for the time being to the case where Θ is a countable, dense subset of
[0,1]; indeed, it is common to assume that Θ = [0,1]∩Q. Countability ensures that L ΘB contains only
countably-many modalities, and by Lemma 6, density allows us to define βi(ti) to be the unique element
of Pti . We then have the following:
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Proposition 7. Let M be a probability model, and let TM := (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I) as defined above. Then
TM is a type space. Define ν(p) := E0(p). Then IM := (TM ,ν) is an interpreted type space, and for
all ϕ ∈L ΘB , we have
ω ∈ [[ϕ ]]M ⇒ (d0(ω),d(ω)) ∈ [[ϕ ]]IM .
Proof. First we observe that Σ∆(X×T) is generated by all events of the form B
θ([ϕ ]); this follows from
Lemma 5 together with [14, Lemma 4.5]. Thus, to prove that βi is measurable it suffices to prove that
each set β−1i (B
θ([ϕ ])) is measurable. By definition, we know that βi(ti)([ϕ ])≥ θ iff B
θ
i ϕ ∈ ti; it follows
that
β−1i (B
θ ([ϕ ])) = Ei(B
θ
i ϕ),
which is measurable by definition. That βi(ti) concentrates on ti follows from the fact that
(x, t) ∈ [Bθi ψ ]⇔ B
θ
i ψ ∈ ti ⇔ B
1
i B
θ
i ψ ∈ ti ⇔ βi(ti)([B
θ
i ψ ]) = 1.
Finally, the semantic equivalence follows by structural induction on ϕ .
4 Universal Type Spaces and Canonical Models
4.1 Universal type spaces
The existence of a universal type space [17] underpins the use of type spaces as a general framework
for modeling beliefs: roughly speaking, it guarantees that they do not rule out any possible collection of
beliefs. Individual type spaces, of course, can be quite small and omit many configurations of beliefs. The
universal type space, by contrast, essentially includes all possible configurations of belief; in particular,
this means we need not be concerned with gaps in our representation of games.
Formally, given type spaces T = (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I) and T
′ = (X ,(T ′i )i∈I ,(β
′
i )i∈I) (with a common
set X of states), a profile of functions fi : Ti → T
′
i constitutes a type morphism from T to T
′ provided
that, for each i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and each event E ⊆ X ×T
′,
β ′i ( fi(ti))(E) = βi(ti)( f
−1(E)),
where f : X ×T → X ×T ′ is defined by f = (idX , f1, . . . , fn). Roughly speaking, this says that each fi
assigns to each ti ∈ Ti a type fi(ti) ∈ T
′
i that agrees with ti on the probabilities of all events, where events
in T and T ′ are identified via the correspondence given by f . A type space T ∗ is called universal (for
X ) if, for every type space T = (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I), there exists a unique type morphism from T to T
∗.
Thus, each such T can be thought of as existing “inside” T ∗ (via the mapping f ).
Type morphisms are defined so as to preserve the structure of belief. Indeed, given any interpretation
ν : Φ → ΣX , it is easy to see that if ( f1, . . . , fn) is a type morphism from T to T
′, then for any (x, t) ∈
X ×T and any ϕ ∈L
[0,1]
B (Φ), we have
(x, t) ∈ [[ϕ ]](T ,ν) ⇔ f (x, t) ∈ [[ϕ ]](T ′,ν).
As a consequence, the universal type space for X satisfies all the L
[0,1]
B (Φ)-descriptions that are satisfied
in some type space over X . It is natural to wonder whether this property characterizes the universal type
space; the connection with canonical models we now present essentially amounts to a formalization of
this idea.
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4.2 Canonical models
The classical canonical model construction is used to prove completeness of various modal systems.
Given some axiom system AX of interest, a model is constructed wherein each world corresponds to a
maximal AX-consistent set of formulas, with additional structure derived from the properties of these
sets of formulas.
The construction we present here differs in that we are not concerned with axiomatics—indeed, for
logics that fail to be compact (such as, notably, the logic of L
[0,1]
B as interpreted in probability frames),
consistent sets of formulas need not be satisfiable, so the canonical model construction fails. Nonetheless,
we can adapt this construction by replacing “consistent” with “satisfiable”; in other words, we can build
a model in which the worlds are exactly the L
[0,1]
B -descriptions.
4 Intuitively, such a model contains a
world satisfying every such description; ultimately, we will show that we can obtain a universal type
space by constructing such a model and then translating it into a type space as in Section 3.2.
Consider a fixed language L
[0,1]
B (Φ) and a class of probability models C ; let Ω¯ denote the set of all
L
[0,1]
B (Φ)-descriptions satisfiable in some model in C . Define ϕˆ = {ω¯ ∈ Ω¯ : ϕ ∈ ω¯}, and let ΣΩ¯ be the
σ -algebra generated by the collection A = {ϕˆ : ϕ ∈L
[0,1]
B (Φ)}. Define µi,ω¯ : A → [0,1] by
µi,ω¯ (ϕˆ) = sup{θ ∈ [0,1] : B
θ
i ϕ ∈ ω¯}.
It is not hard to check that µi,ω¯ is a pre-measure on the algebra A , so, by Carathe´odory’s extension
theorem, it can be extended to a unique probability measure on ΣΩ¯; let P¯ri(ω¯) denote this extension.
Finally, for each p ∈Φ, set p¯i(p) = pˆ.
Proposition 8. M¯ = (Ω¯,(P¯ri)i∈I), p¯i) is a probability model, and for all ϕ ∈L
[0,1]
B , we have [[ϕ ]]M¯ = ϕˆ .
Moreover, M¯ is universal for C in the sense that, for all M ∈C , there is a truth-preserving map (namely,
D, the description map for M ) from M to M¯ .
Call M¯ the universal probability model for C over L
[0,1]
B (Φ). As we mentioned earlier, Meier
[16] works with an infinitary version of the language L
[0,1]
B (Φ) and constructs a canonical model for
that language. Call his language L
∞,[0,1]
B . Although L
∞,[0,1]
B is infinitary, as observed in [10, Lemma
4.1], every L
[0,1]
B -description can be uniquely extended to an L
∞,[0,1]
B -description. It follows that the
canonical model for the language L
[0,1]
B is isomorphic to the canonical model for L
∞,[0,1]
B . Meier shows
that the canonical model for L
∞,[0,1]
B is universal. Of course, it follows that the canonical model for
L
[0,1]
B is also universal. We given an independent proof of this result here, since it allows us to connect
universal type spaces to the language considerations discussed earlier.
4.3 Translation
Let X be a measurable space of states where ΣX is generated by the singletons {x}.
5 We construct
a universal type space for X by first constructing a universal model as in Section 4.2. Consider the
4As we said above, a similar construction appears in [1], though the connection to type spaces is not explored in any depth.
5It is possible to weaken this condition to the following: for every x,y ∈ X , there exists a “separating event” E ∈ ΣX such
that x ∈ E and y /∈ E. The issue here is that if X contains points that are not separated in this way, they will not differ on any
description and so the universal model construction we employ below will end up identifying them. Notice, however, that this is
only a problem because the universal type space for state space X is required to use X as the state space, even when X contains
“redundant” states that are not separated by any event. Intuitively, however, this is unnecessary—a slightly relaxed notion of a
universal type space would simply require that its state space be rich enough to reflect the measure structure of X , rather than its
set-theoretic structure. And indeed, this is essentially what you get by running the construction below without the separability
requirement articulated above.
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language L
[0,1]
B (X) (i.e., where Φ = X ) and the class CX of probability models such that {pi(x) : x ∈ X}
partitions Ω. Intuitively, this condition hard-codes the constraint that exactly one state x ∈ X is the “true”
state of the world.
Theorem 9. Let M¯ be the universal probability model for CX over L
[0,1]
B (X). Then the type space TM¯
is universal for X.
Proof. The state space for TM¯ is, by definition, the collection {d0(ω¯) : ω¯ ∈ Ω¯}; it is easy to see that
each set d0(ω¯) contains exactly one element of X , and this correspondence is a measurable bijection with
measurable inverse. So TM¯ has the “right” state space.
Next, let T = (X ,(Ti)i∈I ,(βi)i∈I) be any type space based on X . We must produce a (unique) type
morphism from T to TM¯ . To do so, define ν : Φ → ΣX by ν(x) = {x}, let I = (T ,ν) be the corre-
sponding interpreted type space, and consider the model MI obtained from I as in Proposition 2. It is
easy to see that MI ∈ CX , and because of this, for each (x, t) ∈ X×T and i ∈ I, there is a unique di(ω¯)
that is satisfied at (x, t). In this case, define fi(ti) = di(ω¯).
Theorem 9 realizes the intuition that the universal type space for X is precisely the type space that
satisfies all and only the L
[0,1]
B (Φ)-descriptions that are satisfied in some type space over X . Thinking
of universal type spaces in this way makes the dependence on language plain, and suggests alternative
notions of “universal type spaces” obtained by varying the language over which the universal quantifi-
cation takes place. That is, given a class of type spaces T and a language L interpretable in those type
spaces in T , we can define a type space T ∗ to be universal for T with respect to L provided every
L -description satisfiable in T is (uniquely) satisfied in T ∗. Naturally, we might hope to construct T ∗
by transforming an appropriate canonical/universal model. The translation defined in Section 3 does the
job for languages of the form L ΘB when Θ is dense in [0,1]. Generalizing this result to other languages,
both richer and poorer, is the subject of ongoing research.
One natural way to coarsen the language is by dropping the assumption that Θ is dense in [0,1]. An
extreme case of this would be to take Θ= {1}, corresponding to a standard modal language of qualitative,
“probability 1” belief (see, e.g., [9]). In this case, the sets of measures Pti defined in Section 3 encode
only information regarding those events that ti assigns probability 1 to. Another natural modification to
the language is to enrich it with a knowledge modality. Logics of knowledge and belief have been well-
studied, and canonical models certainly exist in such settings (see [15] and the references in [9, Chapter
8]). By contrast, knowledge spaces, an epistemic analogue to type spaces, have been shown not to permit
a universal object [6, 13]. What is the source of this mismatch? Does the translation technique we present
fundamentally fail to generalize to models of knowledge? Or can the canonical model construction in the
modal case inform a new, type-theoretic representation of knowledge that does enjoy a universal model?
We leave these questions to future work.
5 Conclusion
We have related probability frames and type spaces in a way that makes clear the critical role of language.
Our approach allows us to show the deep connections between the canonical models that are standard
in the modal logic community and the universal type spaces that play a critical role in epistemic game
theory. We believe that further work, considering different choices of language, will further illuminate
the connections between these two modeling paradigms.
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